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A LEGAL AND ETHICAL PUZZLE:  
DEFENSE COUNSEL AS QUASI WITNESS 
Elizabeth Slater* 
 
The U.S. criminal justice system is built on the concept of an adversarial 
trial.  The defense and prosecution present competing narratives to a neutral 
audience that judges whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  In this context, defense counsel is expected to be a zealous 
advocate for the defendant, providing the most effective representation 
possible in light of the evidence presented by the government.  However, 
there are occasions outside of trial where defense counsel’s traditional role 
changes and she is asked to disclose, not to the jury, but to the court, personal 
opinions and knowledge about her client and the attorney-client relationship. 
This Note argues that during these occasions, defense counsel becomes a 
“quasi witness.”  Even though she is not presenting testimony at trial, she is 
still providing information about her client to the judge.  Indeed, the duties 
of confidentiality and loyalty that defense counsel owes her client are pitted 
against those she owes the court, spawning a serious ethical dilemma.  This 
Note examines this dilemma and the potential damage that it can cause to the 
attorney-client relationship.  Ultimately, this Note proposes several 
mechanisms for limiting the disclosures needed from defense counsel but 
argues that now that the category of quasi witness has been identified, a more 
profound debate within the profession is warranted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenario:  a criminal defendant is unhappy with her 
counsel’s performance.  She is irritated that her attorney—a public 
defender—fails to answer the phone and has met with her only once before 
trial.  Defense counsel, unable to assuage her client’s frustration, moves to 
withdraw from the case.  The judge asks why, noting that, with the trial date 
so near, granting the motion would result in delay.1  What information can 
defense counsel now reveal?  Defense counsel faces the insurmountable 
hurdle of substantiating her motion without revealing client confidences or 
appearing disloyal to the defendant.  Additionally, if the judge asks further 
questions of defense counsel in an attempt to obtain more information, the 
judge risks damaging an already fragile attorney-client relationship and 
forcing defense counsel to reveal client confidences.  Given defense 
counsel’s desire to be removed from the case, there is a risk that any 
representation she makes will be tainted with bias.  Thus, the judge also has 
to evaluate the sincerity of counsel’s representations. 
Now, consider a different scenario.  Defense counsel becomes aware that 
a client is hearing voices and “responding to internal stimuli,” so she moves 
for a competency evaluation.2  Under such circumstances, defense counsel 
has to decide how to persuade the judge to grant the motion without 
disclosing client confidences.  If she believes it necessary to make 
disclosures, she has to decide whether, under the governing professional 
responsibility rules, she has implied permission to do so.3  Furthermore, if 
the defendant does not want to undergo a competency evaluation, defense 
counsel has to navigate how to request one without appearing disloyal. 
The traditional role of an attorney is to control the strategy of a case and 
make legal arguments based on evidence presented at trial.4  However, in 
both of these examples, defense counsel steps out of that role and proffers 
witness-like statements based on personal knowledge and belief.  This Note 
refers to defense counsel in this nontraditional role as a “quasi witness.”5  
Although not testifying under oath in front of the trier of fact, defense counsel 
acts as a witness on a collateral issue.6 
Lawyers are prohibited from serving as witnesses on behalf of clients 
during civil or criminal trials.7  Despite this longstanding rule, there are times 
 
 1. See, e.g., State v. Harter, 340 P.3d 440, 445 (Haw. 2014). 
 2. See, e.g., United States v. Maxton, No. 13-cr-00411-PAB, 2013 WL 6800695, at *2 
(D. Colo. Dec. 24, 2013) (denying defense counsel’s motion for competency evaluation 
despite assertions that defense counsel could not reveal more information due to ethical 
constraints). 
 3. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (permitting 
disclosure by a lawyer if it is “impliedly authorized”). 
 4. See John D. King, Candor, Zeal, and the Substitution of Judgment:  Ethics and the 
Mentally Ill Criminal Defendant, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 207, 209–10 (2008). 
 5. See infra Part I.A for a definition of “quasi witness.” 
 6. A “collateral issue” is “a question or issue not directly connected with the matter in 
dispute.” Collateral Issue, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  See infra Part I.C for 
examples of collateral issues in which defense counsel may end up in the role of witness. 
 7. See infra Part II.A (describing the advocate-witness rule). 
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when they have to make representations and express opinions about clients 
on collateral matters.8  They are permitted to do so because the information 
they are offering, or are asked for, may not appear to be privileged or 
confidential.  Even if the information is confidential, a judge can still order it 
to be revealed.9  Courts may fail to recognize that placing counsel in the 
position of quasi witness raises serious ethical concerns.  In criminal cases, 
which are the focus of this Note, placing defense counsel in such a position 
has the potential to damage the attorney-client relationship, force defense 
counsel to reveal client confidences, or lead to possible misrepresentations of 
fact by defense counsel who may be torn between a duty of zealous advocacy, 
self-interest, and a duty of loyalty to the court. 
Accordingly, Part I of this Note defines the term “quasi witness.”  It then 
introduces relevant ethical duties defense attorneys owe their clients and 
identifies situations where defense attorneys become quasi witnesses, placing 
those duties at risk.  Part II argues that the American Bar Association’s Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (“the Model Rules”) fail to provide guidance 
to defense attorneys in the position of quasi witness.  It demonstrates that, 
lacking guidance, judges have developed informal ad hoc approaches to deal 
with the challenges posed by defense attorneys in the role of quasi witness.  
Part II then analyzes these approaches and their shortcomings.  Finally, Part 
III provides guidance to defense attorneys and judges in light of this often 
overlooked issue. 
I.  THE PREVIOUSLY UNRECOGNIZED PROBLEM 
OF THE QUASI WITNESS 
The role of a defense attorney is by nature complicated.  Defense attorneys 
have to strike a delicate balance as advocates for their clients while 
simultaneously being officers of the court.  This task is made ever more 
difficult when defense attorneys become quasi witnesses.  This part defines 
the new, unique term of “quasi witness.”  It then analyzes the ethics issues 
that come into play.  Finally, it brings to the fore a myriad of scenarios when 
defense counsel becomes a quasi witness. 
A.  What Is a Quasi Witness? 
There are times when attorneys make representations about a client based 
on personal knowledge or belief.10  They may be asked to do so by a judge, 
or they may do so voluntarily in an attempt to influence a judge’s decision 
on a collateral matter.11  In criminal practice, this occurs when defense 
counsel has to make representations about a client to assist the judge in 
deciding a procedural issue.  Such procedural issues may include when 
defense counsel must substantiate a motion to withdraw, expose a 
 
 8. See infra Part I.C for examples of collateral issues in which defense counsel may end 
up in the role of witness. 
 9. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(6) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 10. See infra Part I.C. 
 11. See infra Part I.C. 
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defendant’s intent to commit perjury, make representations about a 
defendant’s competency, divulge to the judge a belief about a waiver being 
knowing and intelligent, and present information about a defendant’s absence 
or prior convictions.12 
In making these representations, defense counsel inherently provides 
personal beliefs based on information that the client has revealed to counsel 
or on counsel’s own observations about the attorney-client relationship.13  
Whether intentional or not, defense attorneys making representations based 
on personal knowledge or belief are quasi witnesses.  They simultaneously 
fit and do not fit within the definition of “witness”—they “see[], know[], 
[and] vouch[] for something,” but they do not give “testimony under oath or 
affirmation (1) in person, (2) by oral or written deposition, or (3) by 
affidavit.”14  Further lending defense counsel the quasi witness moniker, the 
information provided to a judge by defense counsel acting in this role is 
unrelated to the merits of the defendant’s case.15  It does not directly relate 
to whether the defendant is innocent or guilty but rather is intended to sway 
the judge with regard to procedural outcomes.16 
Substantial concerns arise from a defense attorney acting as a quasi 
witness.  This Note focuses on several in particular:  the harm to the attorney-
client relationship that occurs when a client perceives defense counsel as 
disloyal, the potential for defense counsel to reveal confidential information 
provided by the client, and the potential for defense counsel to make biased 
representations either out of self-interest or to receive a favorable ruling for 
a client.17 
 
 12. See infra Part I.C. 
 13. For example, defense counsel’s belief that a client is incompetent may come from 
statements made by the defendant or from defense counsel’s observations about the 
defendant’s behavior. 
 14. Witness, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also People v. Martin, 26 
N.W.2d 558, 560 (Mich. 1947) (holding that a “witness” is a person who is “sworn and 
examined in open court”). 
 15. “Merits” are “[t]he elements or grounds of acclaim or defense; the substantive 
considerations to be taken into account in deciding a case, as opposed to extraneous or 
technical points, esp[ecially] of procedure.” Merits, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 16. Formal and unsworn witnesses, in contrast, provide information intended to be used 
as evidence regarding the merits of a case.  Unsworn witnesses have intimate knowledge of 
the events of a case, partially resulting from their own involvement in the activities in dispute. 
See, e.g., United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 933 (2d. Cir. 1993); see also Roxanne 
Malaspina, Resolving the Conflict of the Unsworn Witness:  A Framework for Disqualifying 
House Counsel Under the Advocate-Witness Rule, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1073, 1095 (1992).  
Defense counsel in the position of quasi witness does not have insider knowledge of the 
activities that resulted in defendant’s charge. 
 17. Indeed, oftentimes an attorney’s representations made as quasi witness are harmless 
and make no dent in the attorney-client relationship.  This Note, however, focuses on the 
anomalous situation of when defense counsel’s representations are not harmless and raise 
grave ethical concerns. 
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B.  Ethics Duties Threatened by Defense Counsel 
in the Role of Quasi Witness 
Criminal defense attorneys owe their clients and the court several ethical 
duties that stem from being agents of their clients and, simultaneously, 
officers of the court.18  To their clients, defense attorneys owe a duty of 
zealous advocacy.19  To fulfill this duty, they must build productive 
relationships with their clients,20 maintain confidences,21 and not reveal 
privileged information.22  To the court, defense attorneys owe a duty of 
candor.23  These ethical responsibilities are rooted in our notions of what 
creates a successful adversarial system that simultaneously protects the truth 
and the individual rights of defendants.24  This part introduces these 
competing ethical obligations, explores their justifications, and highlights the 
governing Model Rules.25 
1.  Duty of Zealous Advocacy 
Our adversarial criminal justice system depends on counsel’s ability to be 
loyal to her client26 and serve as a zealous advocate on her client’s behalf.27  
 
 18. See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 361–62 
(1989) (“At the heart of attorney-client confidentiality rules is the notion that lawyers are 
clients’ agents, and often their fiduciaries.”). 
 19. See Rodney J. Uphoff, Introduction to ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE LAWYER:  PRACTICAL ANSWERS TO TOUGH QUESTIONS, at xxiv (Rodney J. Uphoff 
ed., 1995) (“In trying to be a zealous advocate, defense counsel frequently finds that counsel’s 
responsibilities as a zealous advocate clash with the interests of the judge, the legal system, 
third parties, or counsel’s own interests.”). 
 20. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 21. See infra Part I.B.3.a. 
 22. See infra Part I.B.3.b. 
 23. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 24. See Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 
78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 121 (1987) (describing the various theories behind the 
adversarial trial). 
 25. The ethical duties that lawyers owe their clients are delineated in standards 
disseminated by the American Bar Association (ABA), state rules of professional 
responsibility, formal and informal ethics opinions, the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers, and common law doctrines. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1980); CANONS OF ETHICS (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS (AM. LAW INST. 2000).  The ABA’s standards are the most influential, 
and many jurisdictions have adopted them as law. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and 
Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 873, 875–76 (2012); Ría A. Tabacco, Note, 
Defensible Ethics:  A Proposal to Revise the ABA Model Rules for Criminal Defense Lawyer-
Authors, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 568, 574 (2008) (explaining that almost every state has “sculpted 
its code from the ABA’s block”).  Furthermore, because federal courts rely “on state-court 
rules and state-court disciplinary processes,” standards established by the ABA have set the 
landscape for how both state and federal courts regulate attorney conduct. Green, supra, at 
875. 
 26. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 146 (1986) (“[T]he client-lawyer 
relationship . . . is founded on the lawyer’s virtually total loyalty to the client and client’s 
interests.”). 
 27. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (“The duty of a lawyer . . . is to 
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.”); WOLFRAM, supra note 26, at 
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Zealous advocacy furthers the truth-seeking goal of the criminal justice 
system by enabling “a clash between proponents of conflicting views.”28  
Zealousness has been a guiding principle within the adversarial system for 
centuries, with scholars continuously discussing and reaffirming the early 
statement by Lord Henry Brougham that 
an advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the 
world, and that person is his client.  To save that client by all means and 
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, 
to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must 
not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon 
others.  Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must 
go on reckless of consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to 
involve his country in confusion.29 
In being a loyal and zealous advocate, defense counsel is obligated to “use 
legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client’s cause.”30  Defense 
counsel must address the evidence in a case and “devote energy, intelligence, 
skill, and personal commitment to the single goal of furthering the client’s 
interests as those are ultimately defined by the client.”31 
Defense counsel in the role of quasi witness is not acting as an advocate—
she is not making legal arguments.  Rather, she is making representations 
about the defendant based on her own personal opinions or knowledge.32  
This conflicts with the duty of loyalty and zeal, as defense counsel’s personal 
viewpoints may sully the judge’s or prosecution’s assessment of the 
defendant.  If defense counsel presents information that is unfavorable to the 
defendant, defense counsel is not furthering the client’s goals.  However, if 
defense counsel presents information that is favorable to the client, there is a 
risk that defense counsel will be perceived to be acting as a loyal and zealous 
advocate, and, therefore, the judge will not give full credit to counsel’s 
representations.33 
 
317 (stating that lawyers “may be subjected to a greater requirement of zealousness than other 
agents”). 
 28. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer:  
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1470 (1966). 
 29. TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE:  PART II, at 3 (N.Y., James Cockcroft & Co. 1874); see 
also MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS §§ 4.01, 4.04 
(4th ed. 2010); Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1165 (2006). 
But see Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV 1, 4 (2005) (providing an in-depth discussion on whether our legal system ever 
fully embraced Lord Brougham’s famed statement). 
 30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 cmt. 1. 
 31. WOLFRAM, supra note 26, at 578. 
 32. See infra Part I.C. 
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Yannai, 791 F.3d 226, 233 (2d. Cir 2015) (dismissing 
defense counsel’s representations that his client’s absence was involuntary because the court 
saw the lawyer as merely advocating for his client). 
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2.  Protecting the Attorney-Client Relationship 
The attorney-client relationship stands at the heart of our legal justice 
system.34  A successful one ensures that the client will trust the lawyer, 
confide in her, and collaborate with her.  This helps to guarantee effective 
representation at trial because defense counsel can work more “closely with 
the defendant in formulating defense strategy.”35  A defense attorney armed 
with an effective defense strategy and a collaborative client prevents a 
defendant from “be[ing] put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted 
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise 
inadmissible.”36  In essence, a successful attorney-client relationship 
facilitates defense counsel’s ability to act with zeal.  Relying on defense 
counsel to provide her own beliefs and knowledge about a client places an 
immense strain on the attorney-client relationship, the very thing our justice 
system should be geared toward preserving. 
3.  Confidentiality and Privilege 
To be a successful advocate and foster a collaborative attorney-client 
relationship, defense counsel must maintain client confidences.37  This duty 
is considered so important that lawyers will “go to the mat, . . . take 
risks, . . . go to jail for contempt if the alternative is violating it.”38  The 
ethical principle of confidentiality, however, should not be confused with the 
evidentiary rule of attorney-client privilege.  Quasi witnesses may be ordered 
to reveal client confidences but can never be ordered to reveal privileged 
information. 
a.  Confidentiality 
Almost every jurisdiction in the United States has adopted rules of 
professional conduct prohibiting attorneys from disclosing confidential client 
information.39  These rules are commonly based on Model Rule 1.6, which 
broadly construes as confidential any information “relating to the 
representation of a client.”40  Thus, confidential information may include 
counsel’s impressions of a client and any information about the attorney-
client relationship that was not expressly communicated by the client to 
counsel.41  The duty to protect client confidences is absolute.  It never ends, 
 
 34. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Given the 
importance of counsel to the presentation of an effective defense, it should be obvious that a 
defendant has an interest in his relationship with his attorney.”). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
 37. See Freedman, supra note 28, at 1470. 
 38. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:  AN ETHICAL STUDY 186 (1988). 
 39. See Zacharias, supra note 18, at 352. 
 40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 41. See id. r. 1.6 cmt. 3. 
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and must be followed inside and outside the court,42 “regardless of whether 
disclosure would harm the client or not.”43 
Prohibiting an attorney from revealing a client’s confidences “induce[s] 
clients to make disclosures to lawyers.”44  If an attorney safeguards client 
confidences, the client will feel encouraged to reveal information and, 
consequently, the attorney will be able to deliver more effective 
representation.45  As one commentator noted, “Maintaining confidentiality is 
especially important in cases involving indigent defendants, who are less 
likely to trust their court-appointed counsel.”46  Because a large percentage 
of criminal defendants are indigent and receive court-appointed counsel,47 
guaranteeing stringent protection against the revealing of client confidences 
is a particularly salient interest. 
Despite forbidding the disclosure of confidential client information, it is 
important to note that Model Rule 1.6 is not absolute in scope.  It contains 
several exceptions, including when complying “with other law or a court 
order,”48 when the client grants his consent to share confidential 
information,49 and when “the disclosure is impliedly authorized.”50 
b.  Attorney-Client Privilege 
Attorney-client privilege is a common law evidentiary doctrine that 
protects communications between the lawyer and client.51  It is related to, but 
distinct from, the ethical duty of confidentiality.  There are several important 
differences between the two.  First, attorney-client privilege is narrower in 
scope than the duty of confidentiality.52  It only protects communications 
 
 42. See Jenna C. Newmark, Note, The Lawyer’s “Prisoner’s Dilemma”:  Duty and Self-
Defense in Postconviction Ineffectiveness Claims, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 699, 710 (2010). 
 43. Id. 
 44. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 54 (1998). 
 45. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 268–69 
(3d ed. 1999). But see Zacharias, supra note 18, at 354 (arguing that there may be extreme 
situations when society’s interests outweigh the need to maintain client’s confidences). 
 46. Newmark, supra note 42, at 711. 
 47. See LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF 
PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007, at 1 (2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
pdo07st.pdf (“The public defender offices received more than 5.5 million cases in 2007.”) 
[https://perma.cc/3DH4-U4AX]. 
 48. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(6) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 49. See id. r. 1.6(a). 
 50. Id.  Interestingly, the Model Rules instruct attorneys, even when ordered to reveal 
client confidences, to “assert on behalf of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order is 
not authorized by other law or that the information sought is protected against disclosure by 
the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law.” Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 15.  This instruction 
emphasizes the presumption against disclosing information gained during representation of a 
client. 
 51. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1978). 
 52. DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 242 (5th ed. 2009) (“The ethical 
duty of confidentiality under the Model Rules covers a much broader range of communication 
than the attorney-client privilege.”); see also Sue Michmerhuizen, Confidentiality, Privilege:  
A Basic Value in Two Different Applications, A.B.A. (May 2007), http:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/confidenti
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between a lawyer and his client, as opposed to “all information relating to 
representation, whatever its source.”53  Second, because attorney-client 
privilege is an evidentiary rule, “it pertains only to eliciting information at 
trial” and does not protect client confidences outside of the trial context.54  
Third, a court can order an attorney to reveal confidential information but 
cannot order an attorney to reveal privileged information unless a client has 
waived the evidentiary protection.55  A client can do this expressly or 
impliedly through conduct.56  Examples of waiver include when a client 
discloses privileged information to a third party, testifies to privileged 
information in court, or questions the reasonableness of his attorney’s 
conduct when requesting postconviction relief.57  Although a judge cannot 
order the release of privileged information, there are instances when defense 
counsel in the role of quasi witness may be tempted to violate the well-
established doctrine of attorney-client privilege.58 
4.  Duty of Candor to the Court 
Defense attorneys are officers of the court and, as such, owe a duty of 
candor to the judge and jury.59  This duty of candor prevents lawyers from 
offering false evidence,60 ignoring legal precedent,61 or making a legal 
argument based on a false representation of law.62  A duty of candor also 
implies that, when defense counsel is responding to a judge’s inquiries about 
collateral matters, defense counsel maintains a duty to respond honestly.  
Thus, when a judge asks about the attorney-client relationship, the lawyer has 
a duty to provide that information, unless it is confidential or privileged.63 
 
ality_or_attorney.authcheckdam.pdf (“[T]he ethical duty of client-lawyer confidentiality is 
quite extensive in terms of what information is protected.  It applies not only to matters 
communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the 
representation . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/4RHH-LVM3]. 
 53. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 3; see RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 52, 
at 242. 
 54. LUBAN, supra note 38, at 187. 
 55. See State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Ariz. 1976) (stating that only the client 
can waive attorney-client privilege); see also JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 2327 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (explaining waiver). 
 56. See Hawkins v. Stables, 148 F.3d 379, 384 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that a client 
may either expressly or impliedly waive the attorney-client privilege). 
 57. See Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege:  The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality 
Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 893–94 (1998). 
 58. See infra Part I.C. 
 59. Model Rule 3.3 states, “A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding 
has an obligation to present the client’s case with persuasive force.  Performance of that duty 
while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate’s duty of 
candor to the tribunal.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see 
also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 
standard 4-1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993). 
 60. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 5. 
 61. See id. r. 3.3 cmt. 4 (“A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of 
the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities.”). 
 62. See id. 
 63. See JOHN M. BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS:  LAW AND LIABILITY 310–11 (2d 
ed. 2016) (concluding that the Model Rules “generally defer to an attorney’s obligation to be 
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Commentators have acknowledged that defense counsel’s duty of candor 
often directly conflicts with her duties of loyalty, zealous advocacy, and 
confidentiality.64  Consequently, if the judge inquires into defense counsel’s 
personal opinions about a client, defense counsel may have an incentive as a 
zealous advocate to spin observations so that they are favorable to the 
client.65  As emphasized earlier, judges may in turn be aware of defense 
counsel’s duty of zealous advocacy and not give credit to her representations, 
even if such credit is deserved.66  The tension between defense counsel’s duty 
of loyalty, confidentiality, and candor is acutely apparent when defense 
counsel adopts the role of quasi witness. 
C.  Uncovering the Quasi Witness 
There is a litany of instances during a criminal trial when defense counsel 
may assume the role of quasi witness, either voluntarily or through a judge’s 
invitation.  Often, when defense counsel assumes this role, no ethical 
dilemmas appear.67  When ethical dilemmas do appear, however, they have 
dire consequences on the attorney-client relationship and can jeopardize a 
defendant’s chances of mounting an effective defense.  This section considers 
in the aggregate several instances when defense counsel’s representations 
have the potential to betray a client’s trust or confidence or unintentionally 
thwart the truth-seeking process. 
1.  Motions to Withdraw 
and Motions for Substitute Counsel 
During a criminal trial, if an attorney-client relationship breaks down or a 
conflict of interest arises, defense counsel may file a motion to withdraw 
from the case.  Alternatively, the defendant may file a motion for substitute 
counsel.68  In either instance, counsel may have to provide observations and 
 
truthful to the tribunal over an attorney’s (sometimes) conflicting obligation to keep a client’s 
confidences”). 
 64. Id.; see also 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., W. WILLIAM HODES & PETER R. JARVIS, THE 
LAW OF LAWYERING § 10.45, at 10-186 (4th ed. 2015) (illustrating how this conflict occurs 
when a defendant has failed to appear in court and defense counsel knows of his whereabouts). 
 65. See infra Part I.C. 
 66. See infra Part I.C (providing examples of when a judge may not credit defense 
counsel’s truthful representations because of a perceived bias). 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Gauger, No. 2:10-CR-1070 TS, 2012 WL 3155134, at *4 
(D. Utah June 11, 2012) (“Judge Stewart held a status conference where Defense counsel 
represented that Gauger was well enough to go ahead with a plea.”). 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. Kowalczyk, 805 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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opinions about the client and counsel’s relationship with the client.69  When 
she does so, she becomes a quasi witness.70 
a.  Motions to Withdraw 
When defense counsel files a motion to withdraw or argues for withdrawal 
at the bench, she must provide an explanation to the judge for why she can 
no longer represent her client.71  Indeed, the decision to grant a motion to 
withdraw is a discretionary one residing with the judge, and lawyers cannot 
freely sever an attorney-client relationship.72 
In most jurisdictions, a judge will require a showing of “good cause” when 
deciding a motion to withdraw.73  Neither case law nor the Model Rules 
specifically define what defense counsel must reveal in her showing of good 
cause, although the Model Rules and ethics opinions proscribe attorneys from 
initially offering client confidences.74  In particular, there is minimal 
guidance about what defense counsel may reveal if the motion is filed 
immediately before, after, or during trial, when the judge will naturally be 
 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 352 F.3d 511, 516 (1st Cir. 2003) (describing the 
district court judge’s request that defense counsel confirm his client’s reasons for wanting new 
counsel); United States v. Richardson, 894 F.2d 492, 497 (1st Cir. 1990) (“The court 
questioned both [defense counsel] and [the defendant] that morning.”); Frazier v. State, 15 
S.W.3d 263, 265–66 (Tex. App. 2000) (“Neither did [defense counsel] offer any facts to 
demonstrate ‘irreconcilable differences’ as alleged in the pretrial motion.”). 
 70. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (arguing 
that “the lawyer’s statement that professional considerations require termination of the 
representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient” to avoid disclosing confidential 
information); 1 HAZARD, HODES & JARVIS, supra note 64, § 21.17, at 21-40 to -41 (stating that 
a lawyer must provide reasons for her motion to withdraw and, in doing so, may reveal 
confidences). 
 71. See supra note 70; see also In re Jamieko A., 597 N.Y.S.2d 72, 73 (App. Div. 1993) 
(denying counsel’s motion because “no sound reason was provided why counsel should be 
allowed to withdraw”); McKelvey v. Oltmann, 222 N.Y.S.2d 900, 902 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (“[A]n 
attorney may terminate his relationship with a client at any time for a good and sufficient cause 
and upon reasonable notice.”), aff’d, 229 N.Y.S.2d 814 (App. Div. 1962); 1 HAZARD, HODES 
& JARVIS, supra note 64, § 21.02 (“[T]he client’s investment in the lawyer may be repudiated 
only for compelling reasons.”); WOLFRAM, supra note 26, at 550 (“A lawyer clearly may not 
withdraw without a reason if to do so would materially prejudice the client’s interests . . . .”). 
 72. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(c) (“A lawyer must comply with applicable 
law requiring . . . permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation.”); see also 
United States v. Oberoi, 331 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing the deferential standard 
appellate courts use to review decisions regarding motions to withdraw). 
 73. See In re Dunn, 98 N.E. 914, 916 (N.Y. 1912); Battani, Ltd. v. Bar-Car, Ltd., 299 
N.Y.S.2d 629, 631 (Civ. Ct. 1969) (“The attorney may terminate the relation upon good 
cause.”); McKelvey, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 902; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(7); 
see also Lindsey R. Goldstein, Note, A View from the Bench:  Why Judges Fail to Protect 
Trust and Confidence in the Lawyer-Client Relationship—An Analysis and Proposal for 
Reform, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2665, 2672–73 (2005) (describing the challenge of defining 
“good cause”). 
 74. See Ambrose v. Detroit Edison Co., 237 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) 
(stating that there is no general rule for what an attorney must reveal in her motion to 
withdraw); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16 cmt. 3 (reasoning that lawyers 
“should be mindful” of their duty to keep client confidences); Or. State Bar, Formal Op. 2011-
185 (2011) (“Lawyer’s obligation not to reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client continues even when moving to withdraw from representing Client.”). 
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less inclined to replace counsel.75  In United States v. Trevino,76 for example, 
the court denied a federal defender’s motion to withdraw, refusing to accept 
“counsel’s assertion of a conflict of interest in the absence of any evidence 
that the asserted conflict exists.”77  In United States v. O’Connor,78 the 
Second Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of defense counsel’s motion 
to withdraw, despite defense counsel’s unabashed assertion that his 
“conviction would not be behind” any defense he made on behalf of his 
client.79 
When defense counsel files a motion to withdraw near, during, or 
immediately after a conviction (but before sentencing), defense counsel has 
an incentive to assert representations about the client and the attorney-client 
relationship.  Judges often are disinclined to grant motions to withdraw at 
such critical stages in the proceeding, so defense counsel may make 
representations in an attempt to further persuade the judge to grant the 
motion.80  If defense counsel provides a minimal amount of information 
relating to the client, she risks a denial of the motion and an order requiring 
continued representation of the defendant, despite the existence of conflict or 
the deterioration of the attorney-client relationship.81  If defense counsel 
divulges client confidences to persuade the judge to grant the motion, defense 
counsel not only violates a revered ethical rule, but she also jeopardizes the 
trial by prejudicing the client in front of the judge who will be hearing the 
case.82  Finally, should defense counsel provide only an impression of the 
 
 75. See United States v. Trevino, 992 F.2d 64, 66 (5th Cir. 1993) (denying counsel’s 
motion to withdraw because defense counsel did not provide sufficient evidence that a conflict 
existed); see also Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal 
Op. 2015-192 (2015) (stating that a dearth of authority makes it difficult to “categorically 
opine” whether defense counsel should provide information relating to the representation of a 
client when a court orders her to do so); Memorandum & Order at 4, United States v. Ashburn, 
No. 11-CR-0303 (NGG) (E.D.N.Y. May 8, 2015), ECF No. 480 (denying defense counsels’ 
motions to withdraw immediately postconviction despite conflicting testimony from defense 
counsel and defendant). But see Or. State Bar, Formal Op. 2011-185 (stating that an attorney 
may reveal information relating to the representation of a client if ordered to do so by 
a judge but “may only do so to the extent ‘reasonably necessary’ to comply with the court 
order”). 
 76. 992 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 77. Id. at 65. 
 78. 650 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 79. Id. at 849. 
 80. See, e.g., id.; N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 1057 (2015) (stating 
that judges may require more information “when withdrawal is sought on the eve of trial or 
there has been a history of dilatory tactics”); see also Carol T. Rieger, Client Perjury:  A 
Proposed Resolution of the Constitutional and Ethical Issues, 70 MINN. L. REV. 121, 124 
(1985) (describing how judges may deny motions to withdraw because “trial may be 
imminent, because the confrontation may not take place until after the trial has started, or 
because no other counsel is available”). 
 81. See, e.g., Aceves v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 281 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(reversing trial court’s decision to deny defense counsel’s motion to withdraw after he stated 
that he could not reveal the nature of the conflict without divulging client confidences); State 
v. Harter, 340 P.3d 440, 449 (Haw. 2014) (reversing the trial court’s decision to deny defense 
counsel’s motion to withdraw). 
 82. See infra Part I.C.2 for examples of when defense counsel, moving to withdraw, 
reveals to the judiciary a defendant’s intent to commit perjury. 
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attorney-client relationship to the judge—by describing reasons for 
withdrawal in vague terms—defense counsel may still violate attorney-client 
confidences, albeit less blatantly, and risk further losing the client’s trust.83  
This would be especially detrimental if the motion for withdrawal is denied 
and defense counsel has to continue representing the defendant.84 
b.  Motions for Substitute Counsel 
In motions for substitute counsel, a defense attorney may have to provide 
information about a client in response to allegations made against defense 
counsel.85  Judges often view such motions with skepticism, particularly 
when made by indigent defendants.86  The trial judge, however, cannot deny 
a motion for substitute counsel without first inquiring into the defendant’s 
complaint.87  Logically, this generates the risk that defense counsel will be 
obliged to respond to the defendant’s allegations and, in so doing, become a 
quasi witness.  Defense counsel may have to submit observations about her 
relationship with the client.88  Defense counsel also may risk revealing client 
confidences and appearing disloyal to the client.89  As with motions to 
withdraw, this is particularly concerning if the motion for substitute counsel 
is denied and defense counsel must resume representation. 
When defense counsel becomes a quasi witness because of a motion to 
withdraw or in response to a defendant’s allegations, additional concerns 
emphasized by this Note arise—i.e., the reliability of defense counsel’s 
representations and the credence given those representations by the judge.  
Defense attorneys may be inclined to exaggerate the extent of the conflict or 
 
 83. See Or. State Bar, Formal Op. 2011-185 (2011) (prohibiting phrases such as “[m]y 
client won’t listen to my advice” and “[m]y client won’t cooperate with me” to be used in 
withdrawal motions because they are based on information relating to the representation of a 
client, which is confidential). 
 84. See, e.g., Harter, 340 P.3d at 446 (demonstrating that defense counsel felt that if the 
motion were denied, she would be impaired in her “ability to prepare [the defendant] or advise 
her regarding her potential or her rights to testify in her own defense”). 
 85. See, e.g., United States v. Kowalczyk, 805 F.3d 847, 852–53 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(describing the trial court’s decision to hold a status conference with both the defendant and 
defense counsel to discuss defendant’s motion for substitute counsel); United States v. Allen, 
789 F.2d 90, 92 (1st Cir. 1986) (inquiring into the federal defender’s views after receiving a 
letter from the defendant expressing dissatisfaction with his attorney). 
 86. See United States v. Francois, 715 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 2013) (“Though the right to 
counsel is fundamental, the right of an indigent criminal defendant to demand new appointed 
counsel is not unlimited.”); United States v. Teemer, 394 F.3d 59, 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (“A 
defendant has no automatic right to replace counsel and, as trial approaches, the balance of 
considerations shifts ever more toward maintaining existing counsel and the trial schedule.”). 
 87. See United States v. John Doe No. 1, 272 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2001); Allen, 789 
F.2d at 92 (“[T]he appellate court should consider . . . the timeliness of the motion, the 
adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint, and whether the conflict 
between the defendant and his counsel was so great that it resulted in a total lack of 
communication preventing an adequate defense.”). 
 88. See United States v. Avendano-Ramirez, No. 00-2932, 2000 WL 1852626, at *1 (8th 
Cir. Dec. 19, 2000) (citing defense counsel’s representations that “he had met with Avendano-
Ramirez several times, he was prepared to go to trial, and Avendano-Ramirez was merely 
dissatisfied with the attorney’s assessment of the strength of the prosecution’s case”). 
 89. See id. 
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deterioration if they have a desire to cease representation.  Judges may be 
aware of these inclinations and, consequently, may not issue due weight to 
defense attorneys’ representations.90  Evidently, this dynamic can be self-
reinforcing; knowing the judge’s skepticism, defense counsel may be 
seduced to embellish further, and, anticipating such embellishment, the judge 
may unfairly discount a truthful and measured account.  Therefore, a 
skeptical judge may deny a motion when one is warranted, but a trusting 
judge may unnecessarily sever representation based on exaggerated 
representations made by the defense attorney. 
2.  Defendant Intends to Commit Perjury 
Another context where defense counsel may become a quasi witness is 
when a client confesses an intent to commit perjury or to call a witness who 
will commit perjury.91  Here, defense counsel has to navigate two rules:  the 
maintenance of attorney-client confidences and the prohibition against 
knowingly presenting false evidence.92  In deciding what to reveal to the 
court about the client’s intent, defense counsel transforms into the quasi 
witness. 
When a defendant or witness has presented evidence to the tribunal that 
defense counsel knows to be false, the Model Rules qualify defense counsel’s 
duty of confidentiality and advocate for disclosure to the tribunal if defense 
counsel is unable to mitigate the effect of the false evidence.93  In this 
instance, the court determines “what should be done—making a statement 
about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial or perhaps nothing.”94 
What, however, should defense counsel do when a defendant has not yet 
committed perjury but merely expressed intent to do so?  Here, the principal 
ethics concerns involved in this Note arise again.  Defense counsel, in 
debating what to reveal, risks jeopardizing client confidences, betraying the 
client, or appearing disloyal to the court.  One option for defense counsel is 
to withdraw, but this is unsatisfactory because defense counsel would still 
 
 90. See, e.g., Memorandum & Order, supra note 75, at 4 (denying defense counsel’s 
motion to withdraw despite their assertion of the existence of a conflict). 
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Litchfield, 959 F.2d 1514, 1517 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Counsel 
was concerned . . . that the testimony he would elicit during his direct examination would 
include untruths . . . .”); Fla. Bar v. Rubin, 549 So. 2d 1000, 1003 (Fla. 1989) (Shaw, J., 
dissenting) (“Rubin was confronted with a client who intended to lie when placed on the 
stand.”); Monroe H. Freedman, But Only if You “Know,” in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE 
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER:  PRACTICAL ANSWERS TO TOUGH QUESTIONS 135 (Rodney J. 
Uphoff ed., 1995). 
 92. See BURKOFF, supra note 63, at 263–64; see also People v. Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
805, 810 (Ct. App. 1998) (describing the conflict “between the defendant’s constitutional right 
to testify . . . and the attorney’s ethical obligation not to present perjured testimony”). 
 93. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also 
Brian Slipakoff & Roshini Thayaparan, The Criminal Defense Attorney Facing Prospective 
Client Perjury, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 935, 954 (2002). 
 94. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 10.  In this rare instance, the Model 
Rules have answered the challenging ethical dilemmas posed by the quasi witness, 
determining that a duty of candor trumps any duty of confidentiality. See id. 
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face a question of what to reveal in a motion to withdraw.95  Even if the 
attorney manages to avoid explicitly revealing attorney-client confidences, 
the hint of an ethical dilemma may signal to the judge that the defendant has 
suspect intentions.96  Furthermore, if the judge denies counsel’s motion to 
withdraw because the conflict was not made explicit enough or because the 
trial date is nearing, defense counsel may have to act as a quasi witness when 
explaining at an in camera hearing why defense counsel is opposed to the 
defendant testifying, a right guaranteed to defendants under the 
Constitution.97 
3.  Testifying to a Defendant’s Competency 
Defense attorneys may have to make impromptu representations about 
defendants when arguing competency questions before judges.  This may 
occur in two distinct contexts:  defense counsel may need to explain to the 
judge her belief that a defendant is incompetent to proceed with trial98 or 
defense counsel may be asked about whether a client is sufficiently 
competent to proceed without an attorney.99 
a.  Defense Counsel’s Representations About a Defendant’s 
Competency to Proceed with Trial 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s competency to stand 
trial depends on whether the defendant “has sufficient present ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him.”100  As defense counsel’s perception of a client is 
 
 95. See infra Part I.C.1.a. 
 96. 1 HAZARD, HODES & JARVIS, supra note 64, § 21.16, at 21-39 (arguing that vague 
language “will become a euphemism for such misconduct, and lawyers who wish to withdraw 
for reasons that do not adversely reflect on a client will have no vocabulary with which to do 
so”). 
 97. See, e.g., Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806 (describing that defense counsel in an in 
camera hearing “told the court he had ‘an ethical conflict’ with Johnson about Johnson’s desire 
to take the stand and testify”). 
 98. See United States v. Widi, 684 F.3d 216, 220 (1st Cir. 2012) (granting significant 
weight to defense counsel’s representation that defendant was competent enough to proceed 
with trial); United States v. Ghane, 490 F.3d 1036, 1038 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[F]ive days before 
trial was scheduled to begin, Ghane’s attorney contacted the district court with concerns about 
his competency.”); see also Sarah Hur, Note, An Attorney’s Dilemma:  Representing a 
Mentally Incompetent Client Who Does Not Wish to Raise Mental Illness in Court, 27 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 555, 558 (2014) (“Generally, defense counsel must act affirmatively to bring a 
client’s possible incompetency to the court’s attention, otherwise the client may appeal, 
contending that counsel was ineffective.”).  For a discussion of whether defense counsel has 
the affirmative duty to raise the competency issue, see Rodney J. Uphoff, Role of the Criminal 
Defense Lawyer in Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant:  Zealous Advocate or 
Officer of the Court?, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 65, 83–97. 
 99. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, No. A133094, 2014 WL 3707995, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. 
July 28, 2014) (citing transcript where defense attorney states that he does not have doubts 
about the defendant’s competency and the defendant is “intelligent” and that he “understands 
the issues in the case”). 
 100. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
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intimately tied to this standard, it is likely that counsel will become a quasi 
witness either when fielding a judge’s inquiries about a client’s competence 
or when moving for a competency hearing. 
When the court or prosecutor moves for a competency evaluation, the 
American Bar Association (ABA) has stated that the court “may properly 
inquire of defense counsel about the professional attorney-client relationship 
and the client’s ability to communicate effectively with counsel.”101  Thus, 
under the ABA’s recommendations, defense counsel may become a quasi 
witness when fielding questions from a judge about a defendant’s ability to 
communicate with counsel and to understand the proceedings.102 
As the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards are currently 
written, defense counsel must move for a competency evaluation if she 
believes her client cannot proceed with trial.  It does not matter if the 
defendant objects.103  The Mental Health Standards state that, “counsel 
should make known to the court and to the prosecutor those facts known to 
counsel which raise the good faith doubt of competence.”104  Thus, when 
defense counsel moves for a competency evaluation, she becomes a quasi 
witness because she has to reveal information about her client to the judge 
and the prosecutor.105 
The ABA has stated that “[d]efense counsel may elect to relate to the court 
personal observations of and conversations with the defendant to the extent 
that counsel does not disclose confidential communications or violate the 
attorney-client privilege.”106  This seemingly violates Model Rule 1.6, which 
would prohibit revealing any confidential information relating to the 
representation, not just communications.107  Additionally, exposing personal 
observations to the court and becoming a quasi witness strains defense 
counsel’s relationship with the client.  If a client objects to a competency 
 
 101. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS standard 7-4.8(b)(ii) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 1989). 
 102. See, e.g., United States v. Kowalcyzk, 805 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 
defense counsel’s statement that “I don’t believe in good faith that I can represent in my 
opinion that he is not competent”); Widi, 684 F.3d at 220 (holding that the trial judge did not 
commit clear error in finding the defendant competent, especially because his defense counsel 
represented that the defendant “could adequately assist in his defense”); United States v. 
Muriel-Cruz, 412 F.3d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating that it is within the trial judge’s discretion 
to consider “defense counsel’s personal observation that Muriel-Cruz had appeared to her to 
be mentally astute during their recent consultations”); State v. Meeks, 666 N.W.2d 859, 865 
(Wis. 2003) (defense counsel provided her “opinions, perceptions, and impressions of a former 
client’s mental competency”). 
 103. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS standard 7-4.2(c). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See supra note 98. 
 106. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS standard 7-4.8(b)(i).  Model Rule 
1.14 similarly proscribes defense counsel from revealing client confidences when representing 
a mentally impaired defendant. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2016).  The only time that defense counsel is allowed to reveal information relating to 
representation is when pursuing “protective action,” which does not mean raising the question 
with the court, but rather consulting family members, or “support groups, professional 
services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the ability to 
protect the client.” Id. r. 1.14 cmt. 5. 
 107. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 3. 
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evaluation and defense counsel ignores the objection, defense counsel has 
become the client’s adversary, destroying the relationship.  This is 
exacerbated when the defendant hears defense counsel expressing her own 
opinions about the attorney-client relationship. 
b.  Defense Counsel’s Representations About a Defendant’s 
Competency to Proceed Without an Attorney 
Courts apply a separate competency standard for defendants seeking to 
waive their right to counsel and represent themselves at trial.  A defendant 
may be competent enough to stand trial but may “still suffer from severe 
mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial 
proceedings by themselves.”108  Defense counsel may become a quasi 
witness in this scenario because—if defense counsel was appointed—a judge 
may rely on counsel’s opinions about whether a defendant is competent 
enough to proceed without an attorney.109  Defense counsel also may decide 
to highlight for the judge evidence suggesting the defendant is severely 
mentally impaired and cannot proceed to trial absent representation.110 
In such a scenario, defense counsel first risks appearing disloyal to an 
already wary client if she states to the judge that she believes the client cannot 
proceed without an attorney.  Second, she risks revealing client confidences 
in explaining why she believes her client can or cannot proceed without an 
attorney.111  Third, whatever representations defense counsel makes to a 
judge may be biased; if defense counsel is eager to remove herself from the 
case, she may exaggerate a defendant’s ability to represent himself.  She may 
also do so because, as a zealous advocate, she is obligated to advance her 
client’s interests. 
4.  Waivers 
Judges often ask defense attorneys to make representations about their 
clients, without realizing that they are using them as quasi witnesses and 
placing them in an ethical bind.  In particular, there are two occasions when 
judges ask attorneys to verify whether defendants have understood certain 
proceedings:  when assessing whether a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary 
and when assessing whether a defendant’s decision to waive conflict-free 
counsel was knowing and voluntary. 
 
 108. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008). 
 109. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, No. A133094, 2014 WL 3707995, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. 
July 28, 2014). 
 110. See, e.g., Ex parte Panetti, 326 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“The State 
and defense counsel also stated that they preferred that Panetti not waive his right to counsel.”). 
 111. See, e.g., Mitchell, 2014 WL 3707995, at *8 (citing defense counsel’s statement that 
his client is intelligent and that, based on their communications, he believes his client 
understands the facts of the case and can proceed pro se). 
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a.  Guilty Pleas 
When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives important constitutional rights, 
including his right to proceed to trial.112  The gravity of such a decision 
requires the defendant make it knowingly and voluntarily.113  In federal 
courts, judges are required to explain to the defendant the rights he is forgoing 
by pleading guilty.114  They also are expected to “address the defendant 
personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not 
result from force, threats, or promises.”115  In addressing whether a 
defendant’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, judges may rely on the 
representations of defense counsel.116  They might ask whether defense 
counsel explained to the defendant the elements of the charge, as well as the 
available defenses.117  They also might ask whether defense counsel believes 
that the defendant understood the charges.118 
Here, variations of the three ethical tensions highlighted in Part I arise 
again.119  First, defense counsel will have an incentive to assert that the 
defendant understood the charge because, otherwise, counsel might instill 
doubt as to whether the plea was knowing and voluntary.  Second, the judge 
may too heavily rely on defense counsel’s representations and, therefore, 
conduct a less thorough examination of the defendant.120  Finally, defense 
counsel risks exposing client confidences in responding to the judge’s 
inquiries; indeed, defense counsel may find it pertinent to explain the 
defendant’s underlying conduct or representations that led counsel to believe 
the defendant understood the charges. 
 
 112. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (holding that, by pleading 
guilty, a defendant waives “his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to 
trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers”). 
 113. See id. (“[I]f a defendant’s guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has 
been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void.”). 
 114. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(F).  Many state courts have similar procedural 
requirements. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 716 N.W.2d 906, 916 (Wis. 2006). 
 115. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2). 
 116. See, e.g., Brown, 716 N.W.2d at 913 (citing the transcript of a plea colloquy where the 
trial court judge relied on defense counsel’s representations that the defendant understood the 
elements of the charges against him). 
 117. See id.; see also People v. Dukes, 993 N.Y.S.2d 411, 413 (App. Div. 2014) 
(“[D]efense counsel stated that he had discussed the potential defense with defendant and that 
defendant was waiving it in order to accept the plea offer . . . .”); State v. Sanders, No. 
2007AP1469-CR, 2008 WL 4133549, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2008) (defense counsel 
represented that he had explained to defendant what the state would have to prove in each 
charge against the defendant). 
 118. See, e.g., Brown, 716 N.W.2d at 919 (“[T]he state may present the testimony of the 
defendant and defense counsel to establish the defendant’s understanding.”); see also United 
States v. Evans, 243 F. App’x 538, 539 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing the magistrate judge’s 
reliance on defense counsel’s lack of objections to infer that the defendant understood the 
charges against him). 
 119. See supra Part I.B. 
 120. See Brown, 716 N.W.2d at 921 (holding that “a court cannot rely very heavily upon 
mere statements from defense counsel that he or she has reviewed the nature of the charges 
with a defendant” and must conduct its own inquiry). 
1446 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
b.  Waiving the Right to Conflict-Free Counsel 
Judges may ask defense counsel whether the defendant has understood the 
proceedings in other contexts outside of guilty pleas.  This includes when the 
defendant has requested representation from his retained defense attorney 
despite a potential conflict of interest.121  The right to conflict-free counsel 
“is a problem of constitutional, and not simply ethical, dimension.”122  In 
fact, counsel with divided loyalties may be unable to meet the Sixth 
Amendment standard of effective assistance of counsel.123  There are 
occasions, however, when defendants may prefer to work with counsel of 
their choosing regardless of the conflict of interest.124  On these occasions, 
defense counsel may become a quasi witness when explaining to the judge 
that a client understands the extent of the conflict and has waived the 
constitutional right to be represented by conflict-free counsel.125 
In United States v. Rahman,126 for example, three codefendants retained 
the same private defense counsel—civil rights lawyers well known for 
representing high-profile, controversial clients.127  Judge Michael Mukasey, 
concerned that the defendants did not understand the conflicts that may arise 
when codefendants are represented by the same counsel, temporarily 
appointed separate defense attorneys to explain to each defendant how his 
case may be compromised by sharing counsel.128  Judge Mukasey then asked 
the new attorneys whether, in their opinions, the defendants understood the 
consequences of waiving the right to conflict-free counsel.129  Here, both the 
original defense counsel and the temporarily appointed attorneys became 
quasi witnesses when testifying to the extent of the comprehension of the 
codefendants.130 
 
 121. See, e.g., United States v. Youngblood, 576 F. App’x 403, 408 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing 
the trial court’s questioning of the defendant’s two attorneys, as well as a federal public 
defender appointed to explain the conflict of interest to the defendant). 
 122. Bruce A. Green, “Through a Glass, Darkly”:  How the Court Sees Motions to 
Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1204 (1989). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See e.g., Youngblood, 576 F. App’x at 408; United States v. Rivera, 571 F. App’x 55, 
60 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming the district court’s decision to disqualify the defendant’s counsel, 
despite the defendant’s desire to waive right to conflict-free counsel); United States v. 
Rahman, 837 F. Supp. 64, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“[Defense counsel] objected, stating 
immediately in open court, without consulting either defendant, that, ‘[t]hey are perfectly 
willing to be represented here by me and they are here and they are willing to waive any 
alleged conflict of interest.’”).  Joint representation also may occur because the defendants 
have developed a unique relationship of trust with defense counsel. See, e.g., United States v. 
Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 883 (2d Cir. 1982) (demonstrating that defense counsel had an 
established relationship with the defendants because he represented them on previous criminal 
charges). 
 125. See Curcio, 680 F.2d at 883 (“After hearing from the attorneys, the court questioned 
Gus Curcio.”); see also Youngblood, 576 F. App’x at 408. 
 126. 837 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 127. Id. at 65; Lynette Holloway, Kunstler’s Widow Sues over Use of Firm’s Name, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 5, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/05/nyregion/kunstler-s-widow-sues-
over-use-of-firm-s-name.html [https://perma.cc/TFT2-NE96]. 
 128. See Rahman, 837 F. Supp. at 66. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. at 66–67. 
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Defense attorneys and courts face several hurdles in representing and 
assessing a defendant’s understanding of a conflict of interest.  A defense 
attorney may overstate the extent of a client’s understanding because, as a 
zealous advocate, she has to advance the interests of the client who wants her 
services.  Her statements also may be unreliable because she might have a 
pecuniary interest in retaining the case.  On the other hand, if the judge 
discounts defense counsel’s representations out of distrust and finds a 
“serious potential for conflict,” the constitutional “presumption in favor of 
counsel of choice” may be overcome, leaving the defendant in search of 
another attorney to defend his interests.131  Additionally, as was the case in 
Rahman, an attorney assigned to assess a defendant’s understanding may find 
herself torn between her duties of zealousness and candor, as well as how to 
relay information without violating attorney-client confidentiality.132 
5.  Trials in Absentia 
Judges may ask defense attorneys for information about a client for 
efficiency purposes without realizing that such reliance puts counsel in an 
ethically precarious position.  One example is when a defendant has failed to 
appear for trial and the judge needs to determine whether the defendant was 
alerted to the trial date and whether his absence was voluntary.133 
In federal and state courts, when a defendant fails to appear at trial, the 
judge must make an inquiry into whether the defendant’s absence was 
voluntary.134  If the defendant’s absence is determined to be voluntary, many 
courts will hold—subject to a balancing test—that the court can proceed in 
the defendant’s absence.135  Defense counsel becomes a quasi witness when 
responding to the judge’s inquiries about the client’s whereabouts.  If she 
speaks to her client and repeats to the court the client’s explanation for his 
absence, she has obtained her client’s consent and is acting as a mere 
conduit.136  If, however, defense counsel has not received consent from her 
client, she risks revealing confidential information.137  When the defendant 
becomes aware of defense counsel’s representations, he may believe his 
 
 131. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988). 
 132. See supra 129 and accompanying text. 
 133. See, e.g., United States v. Yannai, 791 F.3d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 2015) (relying in part 
on defense counsel’s representations about his client’s whereabouts). 
 134. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c)(1)(A) (stating that a defendant waives the right to be present 
at trial “when the defendant is voluntarily absent after the trial has begun”); see also People v. 
Price, 240 P.3d 557, 560 (Colo. App. 2010); State v. Finnegan, 784 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Minn. 
2010); Bottom v. State, 860 S.W.2d 266, 266 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). 
 135. See, e.g., State v. Thomson, 872 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Wash. 1994) (describing a three-
prong voluntariness inquiry that “ensures the court will examine the circumstances of the 
defendant’s absence and conclude the defendant chose not to be present at the continuation of 
the trial.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Yannai, 791 F.3d at 234 (“We spoke to [the defendant] on the phone from 
his hospital bed in White Plains.  He told us that he did not intentionally overdose on any 
medications.  He certainly did not intend to kill himself.”). 
 137. See San Diego Cty. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 2011-1 (2011) 
(acknowledging the ethical bind an attorney is in when she has prejudicial information about 
a client’s absence and is asked by a judge about her client’s whereabouts). 
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attorney has been disloyal by revealing personal information absent his 
consent. 
How the judge should treat defense counsel’s representations is equally 
problematic.  How much credit should the judge give a defense attorney’s 
statement that her client’s absence is involuntary?  There is a convincing 
argument that any representations defense counsel makes about her client’s 
absence will be biased in favor of the client because defense counsel cannot 
easily shed her ethical duty to be a loyal and zealous advocate. 
6.  Discussing a Defendant’s Criminal Record 
Defense counsel is turned into a quasi witness when asked about a client’s 
criminal record.  This inquiry may occur during sentencing.138  A judge may 
believe it harmless to ask a defense attorney about a client’s criminal history 
because defense counsel would appear to be merely articulating information 
retrievable by the prosecutor.  But, defense counsel also may be aware that 
the defendant was convicted of a crime under a different name or in another 
jurisdiction.139  Such an inquiry places the defense attorney in a harmful 
bind.140  If she provides an answer in front of her client, she risks exposing 
confidential information about him.  His trust in her, in turn, might deteriorate 
and, as a result, he might be less forthcoming. 
Therefore, defense counsel must make the challenging decision of whether 
to betray her client or the court.141  This decision is further complicated 
should the prosecutor and the judge fail to discover a defendant’s prior 
convictions—such a scenario may even amount to defense counsel 
obstructing justice by refusing to disclose her client’s prior convictions.142 
The ABA has recognized that if defense counsel discloses information 
about a client’s previous criminal history, she is violating Model Rule 1.6 by 
relaying information related to the representation of her client.143  Therefore, 
defense attorneys are advised not to answer a judge who inquires into a 
client’s criminal history, unless the client has committed perjury.144  The 
ABA guidelines, however, are not binding law.  Thus, this problem is still 
 
 138. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2004). 
 139. See Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 
1986-87 (1986) (discussing how defense counsel should respond when a judge inquires into a 
defendant’s criminal history). 
 140. See id. (discussing the tension between defense counsel’s duty of candor to the court 
and duty of confidentiality to the client); see also ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, 
Formal Op. 287 (1953) (analyzing three hypotheticals when defense attorneys may feel 
pressure to disclose a defendant’s prior conviction). 
 141. See ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (arguing that the 
lawyer “should ask the court to excuse him from answering the question, and retire from the 
case, though this would doubtless put the court on further inquiry as to the truth”). 
 142. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987) 
(resolving this issue by determining that, under Model Rule 3.3, a defense attorney need not 
disclose a client’s prior convictions due to a mistake on the part of the government and the 
judge but must do so if the client lied about his prior convictions). 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. 
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relevant and illustrates the ethical conflicts that arise when defense counsel 
is forced to walk the line between zealous advocate and witness. 
II:  INADEQUATE GUIDANCE, INADEQUATE SOLUTIONS:  
RULES THAT (DON’T) APPLY AND JUDICIAL IMPROVISATION 
TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS POSED BY THE QUASI WITNESS 
There have always been ethical concerns with attorneys being called as 
witnesses on behalf of, or against, their clients and with attorneys presenting 
their personal opinions at trial.  Such concerns have been addressed in Model 
Rule 3.7 and 3.4(e), respectively.145  Part II.A and Part II.B analyze these 
rules and conclude that they fail to categorically bar defense counsel from 
acting as a quasi witness and from representing her own personal opinions to 
the judge on collateral matters.  Part II.C then returns to Model Rule 1.6 and 
assesses whether defense counsel may disclose client confidences on 
collateral matters.  It asks the following questions:  Does defense counsel 
possess implied authorization to make disclosures under Model Rule 1.6?  If 
so, is there any guidance on the extent of information defense counsel can 
disclose?  Part II.D analyzes the bench’s treatment of defense attorneys in the 
role of quasi witness.  Lacking a clear awareness of the problem—much less 
clear guidelines with which to address it—judges have improvised an arsenal 
of ad hoc strategies to handle the individual ethical concerns posed by 
defense counsel as quasi witness, particularly the risk that defense counsel 
will overdisclose information relating to her client or be biased in her 
representations. 
A.  ABA Model Rule 3.7 
Model Rule 3.7(a) states, “A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in 
which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness.”146  It provides a limited 
number of exceptions for when an attorney can serve as a witness in the same 
proceeding:  (1) when the testimony “relates to an uncontested issue,” (2) 
“relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case,” or (3) 
“disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the 
client.”147  Model Rule 3.7 does not differentiate between attorneys acting as 
witnesses on behalf of their clients and attorneys called as witnesses by 
opposing counsel.148 
There are several reasons why Model Rule 3.7 does not apply to defense 
attorneys who, in a collateral proceeding, provide a judge with information 
 
 145. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 146. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.7(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 147. Id.  An earlier version of Model Rule 3.7 appears in the ABA Canon of Ethics 19 and 
states, “When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as 
the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to 
other counsel.” CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS canon 19 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908). 
 148. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.7; see also Richard C. Wydick, Trial 
Counsel as Witness:  The Code and the Model Rules, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 651, 653–57 
(1982). 
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about a client based on personal knowledge.  Before parsing its language, this 
section proceeds to analyze the concerns Model Rule 3.7 addresses. 
Model Rule 3.7 is a codification of the attorney-witness concern that first 
appeared “in American court decisions in the nineteenth century as courts 
expressed their discomfort with lawyers serving as both advocate and 
witness.”149  Courts and the drafters of the Model Rules were concerned that 
an attorney in the position of witness would be partisan toward her client,150 
placed in the “unseemly and ineffective” position of arguing her own 
credibility,151 difficult to cross-examine because of professional courtesy,152 
and would unduly sway the jury—either the jury would give the attorney’s 
testimony too much credit or would view the attorney as biased and, 
therefore, discount the client’s case altogether.153  Model Rule 3.7 also 
describes the potential for a conflict of interest to develop if the attorney’s 
testimony differs substantially from her client’s.154  For these reasons, state 
courts that have adopted Model Rule 3.7 instruct that when an advocate 
becomes a “necessary witness,” she should withdraw or be disqualified.155 
Nevertheless, some of the concerns addressed by Model Rule 3.7 do 
loosely apply to defense attorneys acting as quasi witnesses.  As Part I 
demonstrated, there are times when defense counsel may be partisan toward 
her client156 or may have to argue her credibility in front of the judge because 
the judge may perceive defense counsel to be biased and, therefore, may 
unnecessarily discredit defense counsel’s representation.157  Despite the 
seeming applicability of Model Rule 3.7(a), there are several reasons why it 
does not forbid defense counsel from making representations to the judge 
based on her own beliefs or knowledge. 
Because defense counsel is testifying about a collateral matter, which may 
be considered an “uncontested” issue, thus falling within an exception to the 
rule, Model Rule 3.7 can be interpreted not to apply to the quasi witness 
scenario.158  But, there are times when defense counsel’s testimony is not 
 
 149. Judith A. McMorrow, The Advocate as Witness:  Understanding Context, Culture and 
Client, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 945, 950 (2001). 
 150. See Wydick, supra note 148, at 660. 
 151. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980); Wydick, 
supra note 148, at 661; see also Ramey v. Dist. 141, Int’l. Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers, 378 F.3d 269, 282 (2d Cir. 2004) (listing the concerns implicating the advocate-
witness rule). 
 152. See Wydick, supra note 148, at 662. 
 153. See id. at 660, 662. 
 154. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.7 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 155. See, e.g., United States v. Evanson, 584 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 2009) (affirming 
disqualification of defense counsel on the grounds that if the defendant were to make an 
advice-of-counsel defense, the government would likely call defense counsel as a witness); 
United States v. Santiago, 916 F. Supp. 2d 602, 618 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“Attorney Crisp’s status 
as a potential government witness at the trial of Melvin Santiago creates a serious potential 
conflict of interest which supports disqualification of Attorney Crisp.”). 
 156. See supra Part I.C.5. 
 157. See supra Part I.C.5. 
 158. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.7(a)(1); Wydick, supra note 148, at 669 
(interpreting the meaning of “uncontested” within the Model Code provision addressing the 
attorney-witness prohibition). 
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“uncontested.”159  A defendant may vigorously contest defense counsel’s 
testimony that the defendant intends to commit perjury, or the prosecutor may 
contest defense counsel’s representation that her client is incompetent to 
proceed with trial.160  Therefore, Model Rule 3.7(a)(1) would, in many 
instances, appear to prohibit defense counsel from adopting the role of quasi 
witness. 
Even if Model Rule 3.7(a)(1) would appear to proscribe defense counsel 
from presenting her own personal beliefs to a judge, Model Rule 3.7(a)(3) 
provides a separate exception:  a defense attorney may testify if disqualifying 
her would “work substantial hardship on the client.”161  This is a more 
convincing explanation for why Model Rule 3.7 does not apply to defense 
attorneys acting as quasi witnesses.  There exists no avenue for completely 
avoiding an attorney acting as a quasi witness in many situations that would 
otherwise result in substantial hardship to the client, and, indeed, there are 
moments throughout both civil and criminal trials when an attorney will have 
to make representations about her client.  For example, a judge may ask a 
defense attorney how she knows that her client is not a flight risk, and the 
attorney may explain to the judge that her client intends to surrender his 
passport.162  Another example of when disqualification would result in 
substantial hardship is when a judge asks the defense attorney why her client 
failed to appear in court, and the defense attorney explains that her client was 
recently arrested in a different jurisdiction.163  In all of these scenarios, 
disqualifying defense counsel would work a substantial hardship on the client 
and lead to an impractical and absurd result, as almost all attorneys would 
have to withdraw or risk disqualification. 
Finally, Model Rule 3.7 appears to target attorneys in the position of a 
formal witness testifying in front of the trier of fact.164  Two of the rule’s 
principal concerns are that an attorney testifying as a witness will unduly 
sway the jury and that opposing counsel will be unable to properly cross-
examine her.165  Quasi witnesses make representations to the judge, often out 
of the earshot of the jury.  Consequently, the concern that defense counsel’s 
representations will unduly sway the jury is less relevant, and the need for 
rigorous cross-examination is concurrently less prevalent. 
 
 159. See supra Part I.C.3 (describing defense counsel’s representations of a defendant’s 
competency, which may be dispositive to the defendant’s case). 
 160. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 161. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.7(a)(3). 
 162. See People ex rel. Tannuzzo v. New York City, 571 N.Y.S.2d 230, 231 (App. Div. 
1991) (setting surrender of passport as a bail condition). 
 163. See United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1360 (2d Cir. 1977) (accepting defense 
counsel’s statement that the defendant had been rearrested as reason for his absence from trial). 
 164. See People v. Donaldson, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 556 (Ct. App. 2001) (expressing 
concerns that a prosecutor who testifies will unduly sway jurors, who will be impressed by the 
prosecutor’s prestige). 
 165. Id. 
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B.  ABA Model Rule 3.4(e) 
Model Rule 3.4(e), which provides that attorneys may not “assert personal 
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness,” also 
theoretically bars defense attorneys from acting as quasi witnesses.166  But, 
as with Model Rule 3.7, there are several reasons why Model Rule 3.4(e), 
despite its seemingly applicable language, does not apply to attorneys in the 
position of quasi witness.  First off, defense counsel, when making 
representations to the judge, may be interpreted to be “testifying as a 
witness,” even though defense counsel is not acting as a formal or unsworn 
witness.167  Thus, defense counsel would fall under the exception to the rule.  
Secondly, Model Rule 3.4(e) is aimed at preventing an attorney from 
disadvantaging her opponent by unfairly persuading the trier of fact, 
especially during opening and closing arguments.168  But quasi witnesses do 
not aim to unfairly persuade the trier of fact, nor are they doing so during 
opening or closing arguments.169  Rather, as this Note has demonstrated 
numerous times, they provide facts to a judge who is considering a ruling on 
a collateral issue.170  Therefore, it appears defense attorneys acting as quasi 
witnesses fall beyond the scope of Model Rule 3.4(e) and, correspondingly, 
are not barred by the rule from asserting their personal beliefs or 
observations. 
C.  Implied Authorization 
Although Model Rules 3.7 or 3.4(e) do not proscribe defense counsel from 
sharing personal beliefs and observations with a judge, Model Rule 1.6, at 
least on its face, appears to bar defense counsel from disclosing “information 
relating to the representation of a client.”171  However, Model Rule 1.6 states 
in particular that defense counsel may disclose confidential information if 
doing so is “impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation.”172  
Defense counsel may, therefore, have “implied authorization” to reveal 
 
 166. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (stating that a lawyer shall not “allude to 
any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported 
by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as 
a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, 
the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused”).  This rule also is 
echoed in the standards for defense attorneys, published by the ABA. See STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-7.7(b) (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 1993) (“Defense counsel should not express a personal belief or opinion in his or 
her client’s innocence or personal belief or opinion in the truth or falsity of any testimony or 
evidence.”). 
 167. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e); see supra note 16. 
 168. See 1 HAZARD, HODES & JARVIS, supra note 64, § 33.13, at 33-31 (“The second half 
of Rule 3.4(e) bars an advocate from asserting personal knowledge or opinions in litigation, 
except when he is testifying as a witness . . . .”); Daniel D. Blinka, Ethics, Evidence, and the 
Modern Adversary Trial, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 10 (2006) (“Rule 3.4(e) appears 
principally concerned with ‘allusions’ and statements by counsel during opening and closing 
arguments . . . .”). 
 169. See supra Part I.A. 
 170. See supra Part I.A. 
 171. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 4. 
 172. Id. r. 1.6(a). 
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confidential information when substantiating her own motion or responding 
to a court’s inquiries on a collateral issue.173 
The comment to Model Rule 1.6 provides no definition of and only 
minimal guidance on “implied authorization.”  It merely states that “in some 
situations . . . a lawyer may be impliedly authorized to admit a fact that 
cannot properly be disputed or to make a disclosure that facilitates a 
satisfactory conclusion to a matter.”174  Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. has 
argued that fulfilling representation “may require making statements to a 
third party, such as during negotiations conducted by the lawyer.”175  He 
argues that there are “many situations in which a lawyer’s statements are 
made ‘on behalf of a client’ in this sense, and are therefore ‘impliedly 
authorized’ by the client, even though the client did not literally issue any 
instructions in the matter, and did not even specifically advert to the question 
of disclosure.”176  He further argues that “impliedly authorized” also refers 
to disclosures where the client “has no genuine choice in the matter,” 
specifically referring to civil matters where a lawyer has an obligation to 
disclose certain client confidences to regulatory agencies.177  Thus, it would 
appear that the “implied authorization” language of Model Rule 1.6 is 
generally not interpreted to apply to lawyers confronting whether to disclose 
information during proceedings collateral to a criminal case.178 
Defense attorneys in the position of quasi witness are accordingly left with 
only unsatisfactory options:  make disclosures to the court and potentially 
harm the defendant by relying on a tenuous interpretation of “impliedly 
authorized” or avoid making disclosures, risking skepticism by the court and 
potentially adverse decisions.  In United States v. Trevino,179 for example, 
defense counsel’s motion to withdraw was denied because she refused to 
reveal client confidences and submit evidence explaining her inability to 
represent her client, an indigent defendant whose codefendant had been 
represented by the same public defender office.180  Under the rule, it is 
unclear if defense counsel would have been “impliedly authorized” to reveal 
her client’s confidences in this instance.  Such revelations would have been 
damaging to the defendant, divulging aspects of the imminent criminal trial 
to the judge.  By not revealing confidences, however, defense counsel was 
forced to continue representation despite the genesis of a conflict of interest. 
 
 173. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing motions to withdraw and motions to substitute 
counsel). 
 174. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 5. 
 175. 1 HAZARD, HODES & JARVIS, supra note 64, § 10.21, at 10-113 to -114. 
 176. Id. § 10.21, at 10-114. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. § 10.22, at 10-118.  Tellingly, Professor Hazard concludes the discussion of 
“implied authorization” by stating, “In any event, the generalization that a lawyer has an 
unqualified duty of confidentiality to a client is simply incorrect in most contexts.  Indeed, the 
generalization is essentially accurate only when the representation involves defense of a 
criminal accused.” Id. 
 179. 992 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 180. See id. 
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D.  Judicial Attempts to Address Ethics Concerns 
Posed by Defense Counsel as Quasi Witness 
The Model Rules are unhelpful to defense attorneys thrust into the role of 
quasi witness because they provide minimal or conflictual guidance.  Courts 
are not blind to the unhelpfulness of the rules and the tricky position defense 
counsel is in when asked to reveal personal opinions and knowledge about a 
client.  Consequently, some courts have adopted ad hoc approaches that 
attempt to balance a need for information with a need to safeguard client 
confidences.  This section attempts to categorize for the first time the ad hoc 
strategies adopted by judges to address the individual ethics concerns posed 
by defense counsel in the role of quasi witness.  It analyzes the effectiveness 
of these strategies, as well as their shortcomings. 
1.  Rely Exclusively on Information 
from the Defendant and Other Sources 
Judges avoid placing defense counsel in the position of quasi witness by 
relying exclusively on information provided by the defendant himself.  
Therefore, instead of inquiring from defense counsel whether she believes 
her client has a thorough understanding of the nature of the charges or the 
extent of the rights he is waiving, judges engage in a colloquy with the 
defendant.181  This practice occurs when a defendant accepts a guilty plea 
and waives constitutional rights associated with proceeding to trial.182  This 
approach is a facially nonabrasive mechanism for avoiding disclosures from 
defense counsel; she becomes irrelevant and, therefore, does not need to 
express her opinions. 
Aside from defense counsel and the defendant, judges also rely on other 
sources for information gathering.  Indeed, in competency hearings, they rely 
on testimony from psychiatrists and family members.183  When a defendant 
fails to appear at trial, judges rely on information provided by the prosecutor 
and, if the client is absent due to a medical emergency, by doctors.184  
However, problems for judges still can arise in many situations because a 
 
 181. E.g., United States v. Carreto, 583 F.3d 152, 156, 158 (2d Cir. 2009) (trial court 
engaged in an extensive colloquy with the defendants to ensure that they understood the 
consequences of their guilty pleas, especially because defendants had decided to plead guilty 
at the “eleventh hour”); see also United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 888–90 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(holding that, in evaluating whether defendants have waived the right to conflict-free counsel, 
judges must advise the defendant about potential conflicts, determine whether the defendant 
understands the risks of those conflicts, and give the defendant time to contemplate the risks, 
with the aid of independent counsel if wanted). 
 182. See Carreto, 583 F.3d at 158. 
 183. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 455–56 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“[C]ompetency determination is based largely on the testimony of psychiatrists.”); James A. 
Cohen, Attorney-Client Privilege, Ethical Rules and the Impaired Criminal Defendant, 52 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 529, 544 (1997) (“Despite its legal character . . . competency determinations 
have been virtually delegated to mental health professionals, whose opinions are given little 
scrutiny by the courts.”). 
 184. E.g., United States v. Yannai, 791 F.3d 226, 232 (2d. Cir 2015) (“[S]oon thereafter, 
the government reported that Yannai was unconscious and that the medical personnel were 
unsure of the nature of his problem.”). 
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defendant’s representations may be unreliable185 and defense counsel may be 
the only other source of the needed information.  For example, when defense 
counsel first moves for a competency hearing,186 moves to withdraw,187 or is 
the only person who knows whether defendant has fled trial.188  Relying 
solely on a defendant’s representations or on sources outside of the attorney-
client relationship may appear as an easy solution but, in many cases, is 
cumbersome and thwarts the truth-seeking process by limiting the 
information available to judges. 
2.  Accept Defense Counsel’s Representations 
Without Further Inquiry 
Judges also avoid placing defense counsel in situations necessitating the 
disclosure of information—particularly confidential information—about her 
client and the attorney-client relationship by accepting defense counsel’s 
representations absent additional inquiries.  For instance, they may grant a 
motion for withdrawal at defense counsel’s request,189 a mistrial when a 
defense counsel represents his client’s absence is involuntary,190 or separate 
counsel whenever a defendant or his counsel claims the existence of a conflict 
of interest.191  Although accepting defense counsel’s representations without 
further inquiry may appear as a disclosure-limiting construct, it is in fact 
inefficient; if every motion or request is granted in attempt to circumvent 
disclosures, defendants and defense counsel will gain considerable control 
over court proceedings and might create constant delays and slow down the 
trial calendar.192 
 
 185. See, e.g., Carreto, 583 F.3d at 156; United States v. Rahman, 837 F. Supp. 64, 66 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (distrusting defendants’ statements that they wished to retain counsel with a 
clear conflict of interest). 
 186. See, e.g., United States v. Maxton, No. 13-cr-00411-PAB, 2013 WL 6800695, at *2 
(D. Colo. Dec. 24, 2013) (denying defense counsel’s motion for a competency hearing despite 
defense counsel’s argument that he could not substantiate his belief about his client’s 
competency due to ethical concerns). 
 187. See supra notes 73–77. 
 188. See, e.g., United States v. Latham, 874 F.2d 852, 854–55 (1st Cir. 1989) (discussing 
defense counsel’s representation that his client had overdosed on cocaine). 
 189. See, e.g., United States v. Kowalczyk, 805 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 2015) (accepting 
the withdrawal motions of eight separate defense attorneys without inquiring further into their 
motions). 
 190. C.f. United States v. Yannai, 791 F.3d 226, 234 (2d. Cir 2015) (distrusting defense 
counsel’s representation that the defendant’s absence was involuntary). 
 191. C.f. United States v. Trevino, 992 F.2d 64, 66 (5th Cir. 1993) (denying defense 
counsel’s motion to withdraw due to a conflict of interest because she failed to provide 
sufficient evidence of the conflict, despite her representations that providing such evidence 
would violate ethics rules). 
 192. See United States v. Barrow, 287 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir. 2002) (cautioning that courts 
must avoid abusive delay tactics when evaluating a motion to substitute counsel); Richard 
Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel:  The Impact of Competent 
Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531, 571 (1988) (expressing courts’ 
concerns with delay and keeping a criminal case on the trial calendar for longer than 
necessary). 
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3.  Defer to the Appellate Court 
In some contexts, trial judges may decide not to explore an issue fully at 
the trial stage to avoid making extensive inquiries of defense counsel.193  
Thus, defendants are forced to raise the disputed issue on appeal or in an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  For example, in the motion to 
withdraw context, a judge, concerned about delay, could deny a motion to 
withdraw and avoid further inquiry.194  This leaves the defendant to either 
file an appeal (if possible)195 or raise any arguments regarding counsel in a 
postconviction ineffective assistance of counsel claim.196 
Deferring to an appellate court or the court presiding over a collateral 
attack197 is undesirable because, although such action avoids the disclosure 
of confidential information by the defense attorney, it is detrimental to the 
defendant, who may be forced to plead guilty before being able to appeal the 
issue or may have to pay for counsel and wait in jail while his appeal or 
postconviction motion is litigated and decided.  Moreover, the reviewing 
court will decide the issue under a different standard.198  Defendants, for 
example, must meet a high standard in ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, making it unlikely that any problematic behavior on the part of 
defense counsel will be remedied through such a claim.199 
4.  Find a Creative Solution:  The Narrative Approach 
Although not applicable to all contexts, some courts minimize the need for 
disclosures from defense counsel by permitting counsel to pursue a middle 
ground between explicitly revealing to the judge client confidences and 
betraying a duty of candor to the court.  This might occur when defense 
counsel strongly believes that a client will commit perjury and, as a result, 
 
 193. See People v. Berroa, 782 N.E.2d 1148, 1150–51 (N.Y. 2002) (overturning the trial 
judge’s decision to allow defense counsel to stipulate to adverse comments made by defense 
witnesses to avoid forcing counsel to withdraw and appear as an adverse witness). 
 194. Defense counsel may move to withdraw because of breakdown in the attorney-client 
relationship but may not be able to reveal more without exposing client confidences. See, e.g., 
Aceves v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 281 (Ct. App. 1996). 
 195. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27.2(b), at 1295 (5th 
ed. 2009) (explaining interlocutory appeals in criminal cases). 
 196. See generally id. § 11.7(e), at 640–41 (explaining procedures for raising ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims). 
 197. A collateral attack is a procedure “through which defendants can present post-appeal 
challenges to their convictions on at least limited grounds.” See id. § 28.1(a), at 1333; see also 
Thomas H. Gabay, Using Johnson v. United States to Reframe Retroactivity for Second or 
Successive Collateral Challenges, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1611, 1613 n.7 (2016). 
 198. See, e.g., Frazier v. State, 15 S.W.3d 263, 265 (Tex. App. 2000) (stating that appellate 
courts will review motions to dismiss under an abuse of discretion standard). 
 199. See Newmark, supra note 42, at 704 (“It is extremely difficult and uncommon for one 
to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim . . . .”); see also Elizabeth Gable & Tyler Green, 
Wiggins v. Smith:  The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard Applied Twenty Years After 
Strickland, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 755, 758 (2004) (discussing the “great deal of deference” 
given to decisions made by defense counsel and the general reluctance “to find that an attorney 
has rendered ineffective assistance”). 
2016] DEFENSE COUNSEL AS QUASI WITNESS 1457 
only allows the client to testify in narrative form.200  This approach allows 
the client to testify, but defense counsel does not engage in questioning the 
client, nor does defense counsel mention the testimony in closing.201  By 
following this approach, defense counsel avoids stating outright that a client 
intends to commit perjury, even though counsel subtly signals to the judge 
and the prosecution her belief that the client is lying.  Moreover, under this 
approach, judges avoid having to ask a defense attorney to reveal client 
confidences,202 even if those confidences are revealed anyway because the 
judge, prosecutor, and perhaps even the jury all recognize that if a defendant 
is testifying but not being questioned by counsel, the defendant is most likely 
lying on the stand.203  While this might seem like a viable solution, 
commentators have argued that this approach is unsatisfactory because, while 
it avoids explicit disclosures by the defense counsel about why she believes 
her client should or should not testify, it prejudices the client if he testifies 
truthfully.204 
5.  In Camera Hearings 
Another ad hoc approach judges adopt when they cannot avoid asking 
defense counsel for information based on her own personal beliefs about a 
client is to hold a hearing outside of the presence of the jury.205  This 
 
 200. See People v. Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805, 810–11 (Ct. App. 1998) (endorsing the 
narrative approach as the appropriate path for defense counsel to take if she believes her client 
intends to commit perjury). But see Stephen Gillers, Monroe Freedman’s Solution to the 
Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Trilemma Is Wrong as a Matter of Policy and Constitutional Law, 
34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 821, 829 (2006) (critiquing the narrative approach). 
 201. See Slipakoff & Thayaparan, supra note 93, at 951. 
 202. See People v. Jennings, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 36 (Ct. App. 1999) (describing that the 
trial court did not inquire further when the defense attorney stated in vague terms that conflicts 
would arise if he were to question the defendant during his testimony and would, therefore, 
ask the defendant to testify in free narrative form); see also People v. Guzman, 755 P.2d 917, 
932 (Cal. 1988) (recounting that defense counsel informed the court that his client would 
testify in free narrative form and the court questioned the defendant, but the court conducted 
no further inquiries of defense counsel). 
 203. See Guzman, 755 P.2d at 932; see also Gillers, supra note 200, at 829–30 (arguing 
that even if the jury does not recognize that defense counsel is signaling that the defendant is 
lying on the stand, there is still the additional harm that the defendant’s testimony is not 
referenced during summation).  In some cases, defense counsel has explicitly revealed to the 
judge that a client intends to commit perjury. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d 
1237, 1241–42 (Mass. 2003) (explaining the defendant’s argument that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel by advising the judge that the defendant intended to commit 
perjury).  If defense counsel reveals to the judge the basis for denying a defendant his 
constitutional right to testify, she violates client confidences, and the narrative approach would 
have no impact on limiting the information received by the judge. See Butler v. United States, 
414 A.2d 844, 852 (D.C. 1980) (arguing that telling a judge that a defendant intends to commit 
perjury compromises the neutrality of the judge). 
 204. See Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American Way:  The Case Against the 
Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV. 339, 421 (1994) (“[The narrative] method, however, 
is generally understood to telegraph to the factfinder counsel’s belief in the defendant’s 
guilt . . . .”). 
 205. See United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 446–47 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that the trial 
judge acted correctly when he discussed “the conflict with only the attorney and his client 
present,” but that “[s]uch inquiries . . . are best made at an evidentiary hearing”); Witherspoon 
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approach has been used when defense counsel must substantiate either her 
good faith belief that her client is incompetent206 or the basis for her motion 
to withdraw.207  Revealing information in camera may seem like a painless 
way to avoid revealing information that may prejudice defendants in front of 
the trier of fact. 
Courts and commentators have proposed several types of in camera 
hearings to permit disclosures by defense counsel.208  They have 
contemplated formal interlocutory evidentiary hearings where the defendant 
is afforded “all rights accorded under the Confrontation Clause and with the 
[same] ‘reasonable doubt’ standard of proof.”209  They have proposed more 
informal hearings, attended only by the judge, defense counsel, and the 
defendant.210  They also have proposed in camera hearings before a new 
judge to avoid prejudicing the defendant in front of the judge sitting on his 
case.211 
Despite the variety of in camera hearings available to judges confronted 
with a quasi-witness defense counsel worried about disclosing information 
about her client, none successfully limits the risk of destruction to the 
attorney-client relationship, especially if the judge denies defense counsel’s 
motion to withdraw and defense counsel must resume representation.212  A 
defendant might be reluctant to share information with his attorney, knowing 
 
v. United States, 557 A.2d 587, 593 (D.C. 1989) (holding that “the trial judge should have 
inquired whether there was a reasonable possibility that defense counsel’s personal conflict 
might impair his ability to represent appellant effectively”). But see People v. Bartee, 566 
N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (declining to adopt a procedure where the trial court has 
to conduct a hearing to determine the basis for defense counsel’s belief). 
 206. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 4.130(b)(2) (“The opinion of counsel, without a statement of 
specific reasons supporting that opinion, does not constitute substantial evidence.  The court 
may allow defense counsel to present his or her opinion regarding the defendant’s mental 
competency in camera if the court finds there is reason to believe that attorney-client privileged 
information will be inappropriately revealed . . . .”). 
 207. See, e.g., State v. Chambers, 994 A. 2d 1248, 1251 (Conn. 2010) (describing the lower 
court’s decision to hold an in chambers hearing with the defense counsel, the defendant, and 
a senior assistant state’s attorney, where defense counsel stated his intention to withdraw from 
the case for ethical reasons). 
 208. See Silver, supra note 204, at 396 (describing the weaknesses in the different proposals 
for in camera hearings suggested by courts in the context of perjury accusations). 
 209. Id. at 397–99 (discussing that if the court conducts a trial-like evidentiary hearing, the 
defendant may be forced to try her case twice, “once in [a] hearing before the trial judge and 
once again to the jury at trial”); see also Witherspoon, 557 A.2d at 592 n.4 (describing the 
“delicate problem” of providing the defendant with a full blown evidentiary hearing disputing 
the perjury allegation because his defense attorney would be unavailable to assist him); Rieger, 
supra note 80, at 155–60 (arguing that “the hearing to determine whether the client is entitled 
to the assistance of counsel in telling his story should not be an adversarial proceeding” and, 
as a result, should not be a full blown evidentiary hearing with the defendant represented by 
separate counsel). 
 210. See Rieger, supra note 80, at 151 (proposing an informal, interlocutory, in camera 
hearing attended only by the defendant, defense counsel, a new judge, and a court reporter 
whose recording of the hearing will remain under seal). 
 211. Id. at 151–52; see also Witherspoon, 557 A.2d at 594 (Ferren, J., concurring) 
(suggesting that the only way to protect a client’s confidences and secrets and avoid “tainting 
the trial judge with adverse information about the client-defendant . . . is to have a different 
judge hear and decide the withdrawal motion”). 
 212. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
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that the attorney had recently disclosed information against his interests in a 
collateral proceeding.213  Furthermore, some of the proposed in camera 
hearings risk prejudicing the client in front of the prosecution and the 
judge.214  If an in camera hearing is not conducted ex parte, the prosecutor 
will be present and may be influenced by the information revealed by defense 
counsel.  And, if the in camera hearing is conducted ex parte, but held before 
the same judge deciding the charge, defense counsel’s disclosures may 
influence the judge and prejudice the defendant.215  Some hearings also leave 
the defendant to argue for himself, while his assigned counsel has temporarily 
become his adversary, raising significant constitutional concerns.216  It is 
easy to see, therefore, that in camera hearings may raise more problems than 
they solve. 
6.  Assign Separate Counsel 
During the Collateral Proceeding 
In conflict of interest cases, courts have attempted to avoid relying on 
defense counsel’s potentially biased personal opinions by appointing 
separate, independent counsel for the defendant during the collateral 
proceeding.217  This counsel’s duty is to explain to the defendant the 
existence of the conflict and the consequences it could have on the 
defendant’s case.218 
 
 213. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. But see Rieger, supra note 80, at 158 
(stating that an in camera ex parte hearing will not erode the attorney-client relationship to an 
unworkable extent because such a hearing will not be adversarial and will “simply be a means 
for a neutral party to resolve a dispute between lawyer and client”). 
 214. In People v. Cardenas, No. 12CA1536, 2015 WL 4312496 (Colo. App. July 16, 2015), 
the trial court conducted an in camera hearing with defense counsel, outside the presence of 
the defendant. Id. at *3.  The appellate court held that the defendant’s right to a fair trial was 
compromised because of his absence from the hearing. Id. at *6. 
 215. See United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 447 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that defense 
counsel’s disclosure to the trial judge that he was worried about client perjury would 
significantly prejudice the defendant); Aceves v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 286 
(Ct. App. 1996) (arguing that forcing defense counsel to disclose confidential information in 
an in camera hearing “would pit the right to conflict-free representation against the 
preservation of client confidences, exert a chilling effect on the constitutional guarantee of 
effective assistance and free flow of attorney-client communications, and leave the public 
defender with a Hobson’s choice no attorney should have to make.”); Rieger, supra note 80, 
at 153 n.171 (stating that because the judge ultimately decides the sentence, he should know 
as little about the conflict between the lawyer and defendant). 
 216. Compare Rieger, supra note 80, at 160 (arguing that if the judge conducts an ex parte 
in camera hearing, the defendant does not have to be represented by counsel because 
“[a]llowing the defendant to be represented by independent counsel at this hearing would 
unnecessarily accentuate the conflict and make further representation by the original lawyer 
difficult”), with Silver, supra note 204, at 398 (arguing that a more convincing case can be 
made that a defendant did not intend to commit perjury if the defendant is appointed 
independent counsel). 
 217. United States v. Youngblood, 576 F. App’x 403, 406 (5th Cir. 2014) (“In the light of 
this conflict, the district court assigned the Federal Public Defender’s Office (FPD) to advise 
Youngblood of the potential conflict of interests . . . .”). 
 218. See, e.g., United States v. Rahman, 837 F. Supp. 64, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (appointing 
two lawyers “to explain to [the defendants] the hazards of joint representation”); see also 
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The appointment of counsel for the collateral proceeding assuages two 
concerns from the bench:  the defendant’s original defense counsel might 
provide biased representations to the judge about the defendant’s awareness 
of counsel’s conflict of interest and defense counsel might not have 
adequately explained the nature of the conflict of interest to his client.219  Yet, 
this approach still fails to address two important ethical concerns that course 
through this Note. 
First, counsel for the collateral proceeding may be less biased than the 
original defense counsel, but it does not necessarily follow that she is 
completely bias free—her duty is still to represent her client zealously, even 
during a collateral proceeding.220  Hence, if the defendant wants to retain his 
initial counsel, the attorney representing the client during the collateral 
proceeding may manipulate her representations to the judge and overstate the 
client’s understanding of the conflict of interest to help him retain his original 
defense attorney.221 
Second, there still persists the risk that counsel for the collateral 
proceeding will experience pressure to expose client confidences, as the 
judge may make explicit inquiries into the basis for counsel’s belief about a 
defendant’s understanding.222  A judge in this instance conflates the newly 
appointed independent counsel with a guardian ad litem.223  Essentially, in 
the conflict of interest context, assigning separate, independent counsel 
attempts to ameliorate the problem of a quasi witness by relying on another 
quasi witness. 
III.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
TO AN OFTEN OVERLOOKED PROBLEM 
Part I of this Note highlighted an important but previously unidentified 
ethical quandary confronting judges and defense counsel:  the quasi witness.  
 
United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 883 (2d Cir. 1982) (establishing that defendants must 
be fully informed of the hazards of joint representation). 
 219. See Rahman, 837 F. Supp. at 66 (expressing concern that the defendants’ answers 
sounded rehearsed and prepared by retained defense counsel, creating difficulties in 
determining whether defendants fully understood the conflict of interest). 
 220. See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining defense counsel’s duty of loyalty). 
 221. In Rahman, Judge Mukasey appointed two independent defense attorneys to explain 
to each codefendant the constitutional right to conflict-free counsel. Rahman, 837 F. Supp. at 
66.  One defense attorney represented to the judge that, in his opinion, his client understood 
the possible conflict. Id.  Another attorney, however, expressed no view about her client’s 
understanding, sending a signal to the judge that the defendant had unknowingly waived his 
right to conflict-free counsel. Id. 
 222. See, e.g., United States v. Liszewski, No. 06-CR-130 (NGG), 2006 WL 2376382, at *2 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2006) (citing counsel’s representations that the defendant “thinks the 
conflicts, potential conflicts, are really moot given the nature of his defense in this case”). 
 223. A guardian ad litem has the authority to reveal client confidences, but counsel 
appointed to explain to the defendant the hazards of retaining a conflicted defense attorney 
does not. See Joan L. O’Sullivan, Role of the Attorney for the Alleged Incapacitated Person, 
31 STETSON L. REV. 687, 687–88 (2002) (“Unlike a court-appointed attorney, who is an 
advocate for the client, a guardian ad litem acts as the ‘eyes of the court’ to further the ‘best 
interests’ of the alleged incompetent.” (quoting In re Mason, 701 A.2d 979, 983 (N.J. Super 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1997))). 
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Part II concluded that ABA Model Rules 3.7 or 3.4(e) do not prohibit defense 
attorneys from disclosing their opinions about a client.  However, it identified 
instances in which the defense counsel’s role as a quasi witness can harm the 
client or damage the attorney-client relationship.  While acknowledging that 
it is impossible to categorically prevent defense counsel from acting as a 
quasi witness, Part III proposes methods of limiting such occurrences and 
calls for clearer guidelines for defense counsel placed in such a position.  Part 
III.A cautions that defense counsel should limit expressing personal opinions 
about a client, despite motivations to do the contrary.  Next, Part III.B argues 
that judges should credit defense counsel’s initial representations without 
soliciting more witness-like statements from them, which risks the disclosure 
of client confidences and additional damage to the attorney-client 
relationship, a touchstone of the adversarial system.  Finally, Part III.C calls 
upon the ABA to specify how defense attorneys and the bench should 
proceed when defense attorneys are privy to information necessary to a 
decision on a collateral matter. 
A.  Defense Attorneys Should Limit Expressing 
Their Personal Opinions or Knowledge About Clients 
There is an array of situations—from motions to withdraw to discussions 
of a defendant’s decision to waive conflict-free counsel—when defense 
counsel will have an incentive to disclose information about a client to a 
judge.224  In these instances, defense attorneys may not recognize that they 
are being disloyal to their clients or may believe that they have implied 
authorization to make such disclosures, especially if requests for information 
are made at a judge’s behest.225  This section argues that defense counsel, 
despite incentives to the contrary, should never disclose personal opinions or 
beliefs about a client, absent client consent or a court order. 
If a judge asks defense counsel to make representations about a client, 
defense counsel should first seek to obtain the client’s consent, even if the 
information asked for is not per se confidential or privileged.226  Seeking 
consent is the correct course of action in circumstances where defense 
counsel must corroborate a belief to a judge that a defendant is incompetent 
to proceed with trial or that a defendant fully understands the rights being 
waived.227  Consent also should be a required initial step in instances when 
defense counsel must inform a judge of a defendant’s whereabouts228 or offer 
 
 224. See supra Part I.C. 
 225. See supra Part II.C (posing the question of whether Model Rule 1.6(a) grants defense 
counsel implied authorization to make disclosures about her client during collateral 
proceedings); see, e.g., Memorandum & Order, supra note 75, at 4 (requesting counsel explain 
their reasons for wanting to withdraw). 
 226. See Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 
2015-192 (2015) (advising counsel to seek consent from the client to disclose information in 
camera). 
 227. See supra Part I.C.3–4. 
 228. See supra Part I.C.5; see also San Diego Cty. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., 
Op. 2011-1 (2011) (instructing defense counsel to state that, “due to applicable ethical rules[,] 
she is not at liberty to answer” why her client is absent from court). 
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details about a defendant’s prior criminal convictions.229  If the client gives 
informed consent, then defense counsel does not risk violating Model Rule 
1.6, which prohibits the disclosure of client confidences.230  Defense counsel 
also avoids appearing disloyal to the defendant and, therefore, can proceed 
without compromising the attorney-client relationship.231  If a defendant, 
however, is incapable of supplying consent, then defense counsel should not 
reveal personal opinions or knowledge about the representation for risk of 
prejudicing the defendant and tarnishing the attorney-client relationship. 
When defense counsel has motives for making witness-like statements that 
are prejudicial to the defendant, defense counsel also should be aware that 
there is no implied authority permitting such statements, even if the judge 
invites or encourages them.232  If a judge requests information from defense 
counsel, defense counsel should first explain that making further statements 
would jeopardize the attorney-client relationship and force the disclosure of 
client confidences.  Moreover, defense counsel should pursue procedural 
means to avoid providing further detail.233  This implies that, for example, if 
asked or ordered by a judge to substantiate a motion to withdraw, as occurred 
in United States v. Trevino,234 Aceves v. Superior Court,235 and People v. 
Cardenas,236 defense counsel should refuse to reveal confidential 
information and possibly move the court to appoint a neutral, second counsel 
to ameliorate the situation.237  Defense counsel also can seek an appeal or 
further review of the decision, as was suggested by the State Bar of 
California.238 
B.  Judges Should Limit Disclosures from Defense Counsel 
About Her Client or the Attorney-Client Relationship 
There is no shortage of motivations for a judge to place defense counsel in 
the position of quasi witness.  Defense counsel is often the sole person privy 
to information necessary to a judge’s decision on a collateral matter, and 
receiving information directly from defense counsel seems efficient and 
avoids delay.239  Furthermore, judges may be more inclined to trust and rely 
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on defense counsel’s judgment rather than that of a criminal defendant.240  
Judges, however, should be cognizant of the ethical risks of making 
seemingly necessary inquiries about the attorney-client relationship.  They 
should be aware of the challenges attorneys face in building productive 
attorney-client relationships and how a court order mandating even limited 
disclosure might eviscerate this hard-earned trust.  Judges also need to be 
mindful that any representation defense counsel makes likely will be biased 
because it conflicts with a duty of loyalty and zealous advocacy.241 
One strategy to avoid placing defense counsel in the precarious position of 
quasi witness is to grant deference to defense counsel and accept initial 
representations without further inquiry.  If defense counsel moves to 
withdraw, a statement proclaiming “irreconcilable differences” should be 
sufficient.242  The California, Oregon, and Arizona state bar associations 
have drawn similar conclusions, with the State Bar of California stating that 
“ordinarily it will be sufficient to say only words to the effect that ethical 
considerations require withdrawal or that there has been an irreconcilable 
breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.”243  The same principle applies 
when defense counsel requests a competency evaluation:  a judge should not 
pry into underlying reasons, unless the client has granted defense counsel 
consent to disclose counsel’s own knowledge or opinions.  If a judge feels 
compelled to make further inquiries to avoid undue delay or “the needless 
expenditure of judicial resources,” then the judge must do so with an intense 
awareness of the risks to the attorney-client relationship.244 
There are occasions when a judge wishes to know whether a defendant has 
understood a right he is waiving, as occasionally occurs when determining 
whether a defendant is aware of the dangers of retaining an attorney with a 
conflict of interest.245  Here too, the judge, while questioning counsel, may 
unwittingly force counsel to walk the line between witness and advocate.246  
To minimize this, the judge should ask whether counsel has explained the 
potential conflict to a client but not inquire further, because the act of 
providing evidence of understanding pushes counsel to expose client 
confidences.247  This, once again, risks alienating the client and forcing 
defense counsel to set aside the long-taught duty of zealous advocacy and 
loyalty.248 
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C.  The ABA Should Provide Guidelines for Defense Attorneys 
Asked to Disclose Information About Their Client 
or the Attorney-Client Relationship 
This Note has identified the ethical problems triggered when defense 
counsel acts as a witness in proceedings unrelated to the merits of a criminal 
case.  It demonstrates that there are no model rules or guidelines that directly 
govern defense attorneys at risk of becoming quasi witnesses.249  
Accordingly, this Note calls for a vigorous debate about how to best fill the 
evident gap between the Model Rules and the reality of when judges need 
defense counsel’s opinions about a client and defense counsel feels 
compelled to provide them.  It may be impossible to provide one rule that fits 
all instances in which defense counsel risks becoming a quasi witness; 
nonetheless, the profession owes itself a clear set of guidelines recognizing 
that the practice of relying on defense counsel’s representations raises grave 
ethical concerns.  These guidelines also should provide the judge and defense 
counsel with a protocol to refer to, rather than relying on the ad hoc 
approaches that are pursued today. 
CONCLUSION 
Defense attorneys and judges should be aware of the ethics concerns that 
appear when defense counsel, during a collateral proceeding, discloses either 
information about or her own personal opinions regarding her client or the 
attorney-client relationship.  In particular, they should recognize that, despite 
motivations to make such revelations, doing so can violate established 
principles of professional responsibility and erode the crucial relationship 
between counsel and her client.  Vigilance and guidance in this realm are 
needed.  Defense counsel should invoke procedural means to avoid having to 
make disclosures, judges should avoid making unnecessary inquiries of 
defense counsel, and organizations—such as the ABA—should create better 
guidelines to assist defense counsel and judges in avoiding the ethical 
conundrum of defense counsel as quasi witness. 
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